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Special Relationships in Flux:  
Brexit and the future of the US-EU and US-UK relationships 
  
Tim Oliver 
London School of Economics 
  
Michael John Williams 
New York University 
 
Abstract 
A British exit from the EU would add to growing strains on the USA’s relations 
with Britain and the rest of Europe, but by itself would not lead to a breakdown 
in transatlantic relations due to the scale of shared ideas and interests, 
institutional links, international pressures and commitments by individual 
leaders. It would, however, add to pressures on the US that could change the 
direction of the transatlantic relationship. From the perspective of Washington, 
Britain risks becoming an awkward inbetweener, beholden more than ever 
before to a wider transatlantic relationship where the US and EU are 
navigating the challenges of an emerging multipolar world. The article outlines 
developments in the UK, EU, Europe and the USA in order to explain what 
Brexit could mean for the USA’s approaches to transatlantic relations. By 
doing so the paper moves beyond a narrow view of Brexit and transatlantic 
relations that focuses on the future of UK-US relations. In the conclusion we 
map out several ways in which US views of the transatlantic relationship could 
be changed. 
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Introduction 
If the United Kingdom votes to leave the European Union in the upcoming 
referendum then one of the United States’ closest allies, one of the EU’s 
largest member states and a leading member of NATO will negotiate a 
withdrawal from the EU, also known as ‘Brexit’. While talk of a UK-US ‘special 
relationship’ or of Britain as a ‘transatlantic bridge’ can be overplayed, not 
least by British prime ministers, the UK is a central player in US-European 
relations.1 This reflects not only Britain’s close relations with Washington, its 
role in European security, and membership of the EU. It also reflects 
America’s role as a European power and Europe’s interests in the USA.  
 
A Brexit has the potential to impact transatlantic relations significantly. It will 
change the UK as a country and its place in the world. It will also change the 
EU, reshape European geopolitics, impact NATO, and change the US-UK and 
US-EU relationships and their place in the world. Such is the potential for 
Brexit to affect the USA that in an interview with the BBC’s Jon Sopel in the 
summer of 2015, President Obama stated: 
 
I will say this, that having the United Kingdom in the European Union 
gives us much greater confidence about the strength of the 
                                                 
1
 The literature on the UK-US relationship is vast. Examples include John Baylis, Anglo-
American relations since 1939: The enduring alliance (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1997); John Dumbrell, John Dumbrell, A special relationship: Anglo-American relations 
from the Cold War to Iraq (London: Palgrave, 2006) and Andrew Gamble, Between Europe 
and America: the future of British politics (London: Palgrave, 2003) 
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transatlantic union and is part of the cornerstone of institutions built 
after World War II that has made the world safer and more prosperous. 
 
And we want to make sure that United Kingdom continues to have that 
influence. Because we believe that the values that we share are the 
right ones, not just for ourselves, but for Europe as a whole and the 
world as a whole.2 
 
The possible implications for the UK of withdrawing from the EU have been 
examined in a wide range of reports and publications.3 However, there is 
much less analysis of what Brexit might mean for wider international relations, 
especially the EU but also for the USA.4  Discussion in the USA about a 
possible Brexit has been muted. A surge of interest can be expected closer to 
                                                 
2
 ‘Full Transcript of BBC Interview with President Barack Obama’, BBC News, 24 Jul 2015, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-33646542, accessed Feb 2016.  
3
 For a comprehensive list of publications see Julie Gill The UK and the EU: reform, 
renegotiation, withdrawal? A reading List. House of Commons Library Briefing Paper No. 
07220 (London: The Stationery Office, 2015), 
http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7220, accessed Dec 
2015.  
4
 Some exceptions include: Tim Oliver, Europe without Britain: assessing the impact on the 
EU of a British withdrawal, SWP Research Paper 2013/RP 07, Sept. 2013, pp. 18–26, 
http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publications/swp-research-papers/swp-research-paper-
detail/article/europe_without_britain.html, accessed Feb 2016; Almut Möller, and Tim Oliver, 
(eds.), The United Kingdom and the European Union: What would a "Brexit" mean for the EU 
and other States around the World? Berlin: (Berlin: Deutsche Gesellschaft für auswärtige 
Politik, 2014); Gregor Irwin, G. Brexit: the impact on the UK and the EU, (London: Global 
Counsel, 2015); and Mark Leonard, The British Problem and What it Means for Europe. 
(London: European Council on Foreign Relations, 2015), 
http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/the_british_problem_and_what_it_means_for_europ
e311252, accessed Feb 2016.  
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the referendum date, especially if – as happened with Scotland’s 
independence referendum – a vote to leave looks increasingly likely.5 As a 
February report in Politico put it, ‘If Washington talks about Europe at all, it’s 
about migration and Greece, not about Britain’s EU future.’6 This is despite 
the referendum being, along with the US presidential election, one of the 
year’s most expected signposts on the direction of international relations.7  
 
For this reason, debates about Britain’s future in the EU should not ignore the 
potential wider knock-on effects of the UK’s decision. In Britain debate about 
the transatlantic relationship often focuses exclusively on UK-US relations.8 
Similarly, debate in the USA focuses largely on bilateral relations with EU 
member states such as the UK. These debates would benefit from a 
perspective gained from stepping back and viewing the UK’s decision within 
the full breadth of the complex and deeply interconnected US-Europe 
relationship. 
 
                                                 
5
 See comment above…  
6
 Benjamin Oreskes, ‘America’s Brexit Blahs’ Politico, 15 February 2016. 
http://www.politico.eu/article/whats-brexit-in-american-congress-obama-washington-cameron/ 
, accessed Feb 2016.  
7
 Tina Fordham and Jan Techau, Global Political Risk: the new convergence between 
geopolitical and vox populi risks, and why it matters. Citi GPS, January 2016, p.48. 
8
 As the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee argued in 2010, the use of the term 
‘the special relationship’ should be changed to ‘a special relationship’ in recognition of the 
other special relationships the UK and US have, not least in the transatlantic arena. See 
House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Global Security: UK-US Relations. London: 
House of Commons, HC114, 2010, p3. 
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Britain’s decision to question its membership of the EU is one in a series of 
challenges facing US foreign policy and the transatlantic relationship. If the 
US has a ‘special relationship’ with the UK then it can also be said it has a 
relationship that is special with Europe as a whole because of shared ideas, 
deeply entwined economic and security interests, multilateral and bilateral 
institutional links, international pressures, and commitments by individual 
leaders. Each of these is under pressure because of the US pivot to East 
Asia; ongoing tensions between the US and European states over defence 
spending and geopolitical views of emerging powers and security risks; 9 
changing attitudes towards the wider multilateral international order, including 
in trade; and growing ‘nativist’ impulses and anti-liberal world order 
tendencies in US and European party politics.  
 
To examine how Britain’s debate about its future relationship with the EU 
plays into these mounting pressures facing the USA, this paper is divided into 
three sections. In the first section we provide some context by setting out in 
more detail the aforementioned international and domestic pressures facing 
US foreign policy. The article then turns to the UK to discuss US views on the 
place of the EU in the US-UK relationship. Third, we look to the rest of Europe 
and the EU itself and what the UK has meant for the US in its relations with 
Europe (including through NATO) and how the US-EU/European relationship 
could work should the UK withdraw from the EU. In the conclusion we outline 
three scenarios – the good, the bad and the ugly – as to how US approaches 
                                                 
9
 Luis Simón, ‘Europe, the rise of Asia and the future of the transatlantic relationship’ 
International Affairs, 91: 5, 2015, pp 969-989. 
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to the UK, EU and Europe might evolve. We argue the US-European 
relationship (whether with the EU or through other channels such as NATO) 
can remain strong as a result of shared ideas, common interests, institutional 
links, international pressures and commitments by individual leaders. 
Nevertheless, Brexit could significantly damage US approaches to relations 
with Europe if it coincided and mixed with other challenges such as another 
Eurozone crisis or an event in Asia that strained US-European security 
relations.   
 
Transatlantic Tensions 
For the USA, the transatlantic relationship remains the most important 
relationship, albeit one that faces four sets of challenges, which also frame 
how the USA views the Brexit debate. The relationship we know today owes 
its existence to the Second World War and the Cold War, conflicts that bound 
the USA to Europe. 10  Shared values of liberal democracy, free market 
capitalism and a history of political, cultural and ethnic links provided a set of 
values and economic interests that helped bind the two sides together in the 
struggles against fascism and communism. The end of the Cold War brought 
with it a host of predictions that the US-European politico-military relationship 
in NATO was doomed.11 Yet their economic, political, social and military links 
provided enough strength to buttress the relationship in the post-Cold War 
world. These ties continue to bind the two sides together. This is most evident 
                                                 
10
 See Jussi Hanhimaki, Benedict Schoenborn and Barbara Zanchetta , Transatlantic 
relations since 1945: an introduction. (Routledge, 2012). 
11
 The most famous of these being John Mearsheimer’s ‘Back to the Future’ International 
Security Vol. 15, No. 1, Summer 1990. 
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in attempts to create a US-EU free trade deal – the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP). Together the USA and EU account for 35 per 
cent of global GDP, US-EU trade in goods and services amounted to $1 
trillion in 2013, with a US trade deficit of $106.5 billion. The heart of the 
relationship is foreign direct investment (FDI), one that dwarfs their other FDI 
relationships. US FDI in the EU totals $2.4 trillion (or about 56 per cent) of 
total US investment abroad while EU companies accounted for $1.7 trillion (or 
about 62 per cent) of investment in the US.12 
 
NATO remains the world’s preeminent military alliance, with combined US-
European defence spending in NATO at $893 billion.13 The US alone, NATO’s 
largest member, accounts for nearly 40% of global defence spending, 
whereas the nearest peer competitors, Russia and China, account for only 
5.2% and 9.5% respectively.14 The US military presence in Europe combined 
with financial (in the early stages) and political support has provided valuable 
support for European integration and the creation of an EU that today unites 
most of Europe. Together the USA and Europe have shaped global 
governance whether through the UN Security Council or the international 
economic architecture and worked together to reach deals such as the recent 
                                                 
12
 Data from the Congressional Research Service, quoted in Phil Bednarczyk and Andrew 
Whitworth ‘US Perspectives on the transatlantic trade and economic relationship’ in Tim 
Oliver (ed.) New Challenges, New Voices: Next Generation Viewpoints on Transatlantic 
Relations, LSE IDEAS, forthcoming 2016.  
13
 Andrew Chuter, ‘NATO Defense Spending Continues to Decline’, Defense News, 15 Jun. 
2015, http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/budget/2015/06/23/nato-
reports-alliance-members-defense-spending-decline/29153965/, accessed Feb 2016.  
14
 SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2014, 
http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database, accessed Feb 2016.  
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Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran and the Minsk II agreement over 
Ukraine. Little surprise then that Atlanticism has been a defining part of the 
international outlooks on both sides of the North Atlantic, not least amongst 
the political elites and individual leaders.15  
 
Nevertheless, for the USA the relationship with the UK and the rest of Europe 
faces four significant challenges. First, the US is shifting its attention away 
from Europe as emerging powers shift the world from one centred on the 
economies of the North Atlantic to one with various centres of economic 
power, most notably in Asia. That shift is intended to preserve stability in a 
region of vital importance to the US, Europe and the wider liberal order they 
have sought to build.16 Despite this the pivot has fuelled fears of a decline of 
US global power causing power vacuums and ‘great power sclerosis' that will 
lead to instability and opportunism by revisionist powers.17 The diffusion of 
economic power and disruptive technologies have led to a rise in military 
spending and capabilities. Many fear this enables revisionist foreign policies 
that seek to end not just regional hegemonic dominance by the US, but also 
eventually global institutions created by the USA and Europe over the last 70 
                                                 
15
 See Linda Basile and Pierangelo, ‘Tectonic Rifts and a Transatlantic Bridge: Insights from 
the Transworld Elite Survey’ Transworld Op-Ed, 28 Aug. 2014, http://www.transworld-
fp7.eu/?p=1576, accessed Feb. 2016.  
16
 Luis Simón, ‘Britain, the EU and the Future of Europe: A Geostrategic Perspective’, RUSI 
Journal, Vol. 160, No. 5, October/November 2015, pp16-23. 
17
 Tina Fordham and Jan Techau, Global Political Risk: the new convergence between 
geopolitical and vox populi risks, and why it matters. Citi GPS, January 2016, pp. 17-21. 
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years.18 The USA has countered through efforts such as the Trans Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) and TTIP, both of which are intended to boost the existing 
rules-based system. While no viable global alternatives have so far been put 
forward, the emergence of smaller regional organisations such as the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has led to speculation as to the 
sustainability of existing international arrangements.19  
 
Second, long-running US unease at low levels of European defence spending 
have reached a point where the USA’s willingness to commit to Europe’s 
security has been thrown into doubt. This has raised concerns about the 
viability of NATO; Washington provides 75% of NATO’s budget and only four 
other members meet the minimum contribution threshold of two per cent 
(Britain, Poland, Greece and Estonia).20 This imbalance will only grow if the 
US goes ahead with a plan to increase European defence spending from 
$789 million to  $3.4 billion.21 Despite this commitment, US decision makers 
are growing increasingly tired of providing a security guarantee for a Europe 
that seems unwilling to burden share, even in the face of an increasingly 
                                                 
18
 John Mearsheimer, ‘The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia’, 
Chinese Journal of International Politics, 3: 4, 2010, pp. 381-396. 
19
 Ramesh Thakur, ‘A Lesson in the Geopolitics of Infrastructure Finance’, Japan Times, 21 
Jun. 2015: Shawn Donnen, ‘White House Declares Truce with China over AIIB’, Financial 
Times, 27 Sep. 2015.  
20
 Naftali Bendavid, ‘Just Five of 28 Members Meet NATO Defense Spending Goal, Report 
Says’, The Wall Street Journal, 22 Jun. 2015.  
21
 ‘Remarks by Secretary Carter on the Budget at the Economic Club of Washington D.C.’, 2 
February 2016. http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/648373/carter-previews-
fy2017-defense-budget-request, accessed Feb. 2016.   
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assertive Russia and a world in which defence spending is on the rise.22 With 
the rise of China, American policy-makers are increasingly focusing their 
energy on the Far East and commitments to allies such as Japan, South 
Korea and the Philippines rather than Europe.23 There is also a very practical 
side to the defence spending disparity between the US and Europe. It is 
becoming increasingly difficult for US forces to work with other NATO forces 
because of an emerging technology gap. US military forces are growing ever 
more technologically advanced, while lacklustre defence spending and a lack 
of R&E and R&D spending mean that at some point in the future European 
NATO forces – including those of the UK – may not be able to work alongside 
US military forces.24  NATO may continue to endure, but it might well be 
irrelevant.25 
 
Third, Europe’s fragmented defence cooperation is a reflection of, and 
perhaps harbinger, of weakening European – especially EU – unity and 
                                                 
22
 Tina Fordham and Jan Techau, Global Political Risk: the new convergence between 
geopolitical and vox populi risks, and why it matters. Citi GPS, January 2016, p27.  
23
 Luis Simón, ‘Europe, the rise of Asia and the future of the transatlantic relationship’, 
International Affairs, 91: 5, 2015; Jean-Yves Haine, ‘A new Gaullist moment? European 
bandwagoning and international polarity’, International Affairs, 91: 5, 2015; Thom Shanker 
and Steven Erlanger, ‘Blunt US Warning Reveals Deep Strains in NATO’ New York Times, 10 
Jun 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/11/world/europe/11nato.html?_r=0, accessed 
Feb. 2016.   
24
 Eric Larson, Gustav Lindstrom and Myron Hura et al. Interoperability of US and NATO 
Allied Air Forces: Supporting Data and Case Studies, (Washington DC: RAND, 2003); Donald 
C. Daniel, ‘NATO Technology: from Gap to Divergence?’ NDU, Defence Horizons No. 42, 
2004; Terry Terrif, Frans Osinga and Theo Farrell, A Transformation Gap: American 
Innovations and European Military Change (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2011).    
25
 Michael John Williams, “Enduring, but Irrelevant? Britain, NATO and the Future of the 
Atlantic Alliance” International Politics 50: 3 (2013). 
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cooperation. The Eurozone’s economic crisis has raised a host of questions 
about the viability of European integration.26 The economic and social costs to 
large areas of the EU have been substantial. Russian aggression in Ukraine 
has confirmed opinions held by some in the USA that the EU has overlooked 
the importance of hard power and as a result of its civilian power mentality is 
inherently incapable of facing the demands of global power politics. Support 
for nationalist parties and Euroscepticism has reached new heights as a result 
of a series of migration and refugee challenges from North Africa and the 
Middle East that threaten the continued existence of the Schengen free-travel 
area that covers most of the EU. This problem was brought into focus by the 
terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015, an event that led US 
lawmakers to question the future of visa waiver programs with Europe.27 As 
Rem Korteweg of the Centre for European Reform summarised the situation, 
the EU appears surrounded by the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: War 
haunts Ukraine, Death harvests refugees in the Mediterranean, Famine brings 
economic hardship to Greece, and Pestilence is busy spreading scepticism 
from Britain.28 
 
                                                 
26
 Jan Zielonka, Is Europe Doomed? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014). 
27
 Alexandra Starr, ‘Lawmakers Look to Change US Visa Waiver Program’, National Public 
Radio, 20 Nov. 2015, http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2015/11/20/456777537/lawmakers-look-to-change-u-s-visa-waiver-program, accessed 
Feb. 2016.  
28
 Rem Korteweg, ‘The Four Horsemen Circling the European Council Summit’ (London: 
Centre for European Reform) 24 Jun. 2015, http://www.cer.org.uk/insights/four-horsemen-
circling-european-council, accessed Feb. 2016.  
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Fourth, the EU’s fragmentation is in no small part thanks to growing 
nationalist, inward looking and populist agendas. These are not only found in 
Europe; the USA has seen a similar surge. The economic success of 
authoritarian models, the stability of states with strong governments compared 
to the chaos seen in states – especially middle eastern ones – that have tried 
to transition to democracy have thrown into question US and European ideas 
and hopes of humanity moving towards a Western, liberal, interconnected 
world. They also contrast with an EU in a state of crisis and a US system of 
government prone to shut down and political paralysis. One outcome is that 
traditional institutions and sources of authority in both the US and Europe are 
increasingly questioned. In the USA this has helped turn political debates 
inward.  
 
Just like in the UK and elsewhere in the EU, US politicians have been uneasy 
at sharing sovereignty, projecting onto the concept an almost mythical quality 
that can protect the US from the complexities and dangers of the world. US 
politics has seen a surge in support for politicians prepared to pursue more 
populist and, to varying extents, isolationist agendas. While support for such 
positions has been most noticeable within the Republican Party, the 
Democrats have also wrestled with a growing unease within the US electorate 
over the economic and social effects of globalisation, liberalisation and US 
involvement in overseas conflicts. This is hardly surprising when the American 
middle class has seen their incomes stagnate to the point that they are no 
longer the country’s economic majority; those in lower and upper income 
Special Relationships in Flux  
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households now match them.29 As a result, strategic efforts such as TTIP and 
TPP have faced strong domestic opposition. 30  It is important to note, 
however, that this populism has exploited rifts in transatlantic relations, not 
caused them.31  
 
Finally, as has happened in Europe, the USA’s changing demographics and 
immigration have shaped political debates in ways that have strengthened the 
voices of those concerned at such changes. 32  The USA’s ethnic white 
majority will become a super-minority by 2050.33  Muslim communities are 
viewed with suspicion in both continents. The millennial generation might lack 
such negative views and be more comfortable with such a world, but mistrust 
of the USA by European millennials and indifference towards Europe by their 
                                                 
29
 ‘The American middle class is losing ground: no longer the majority and falling behind 
financially’, Pew Research, 9 December 2015. 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2015/12/09/the-american-middle-class-is-losing-ground/, 
accessed Feb. 2016.  
30
 Tina Fordham and Jan Techau, Global Political Risk: the new convergence between 
geopolitical and vox populi risks, and why it matters. Citi GPS, January 2016, p.43.  
31
 Phil Bednarczyk and Andrew Whitworth ‘US Perspectives on the transatlantic trade and 
economic relationship’ in Tim Oliver (ed.) New Challenges, New Voices: Next Generation 
Viewpoints on Transatlantic Relations, LSE IDEAS, forthcoming 2016.  
32
 Matthew Goodwin and Caitlin Milazzo, ‘Britain, the European Union and the Referendum: 
What drives Euroscepticism?’ Chatham House Briefing, Dec. 2015, 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/20151209Eur
oscepticismGoodwinMilazzo.pdf, accessed Feb. 2016.   
33
 Sam Roberts, ‘Projections put whites in minority in U.S. by 2050’ New York Times, 17 
December 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/18/us/18census.html?_r=0 , accessed Mar 
2016.  
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American counterparts do not suggest strong foundations for the future of US-
European relations.34 
 
US-British Relations  
When in 1962 retired US Secretary of State Dean Acheson famously told US 
Army Officer Cadets at West Point that, ‘Great Britain has lost an empire and 
has not yet found a role’ he immediately followed this with the sentence, ‘The 
attempt to play a separate power role apart from Europe, a role based on a 
“special relationship” with the U.S. and on being the head of a 
“commonwealth” which has no political structure, unity, or strength—this role 
is about played out.’35  
 
His warning about playing ‘a separate power role apart from Europe’ has not 
been one the British have willingly heeded. Despite this, the UK has played a 
central part in both US engagement in Europe’s geopolitics and the 
development of the EU. Acheson’s speech reflected a growing opinion in 
Washington D.C. that led US Administrations from Kennedy onwards to push 
for British participation in European integration. Acheson’s speech was 
received in Britain with a barrage of criticism, a harbinger of the difficulties that 
were to follow in being a part of Europe rather than apart from it.36 Britain’s 
                                                 
34
 Parke Nicholson, ‘US views of politics and values in the transatlantic relationship’ in Tim 
Oliver (ed.) New Challenges, New Voices: Next Generation Viewpoints on Transatlantic 
Relations, LSE IDEAS, forthcoming 2016.  
35
 Dean Acheson, 'Our Atlantic alliance: the political and economic strands', speech 
delivered at the United States Military Academy, West Point, 5 Dec 1962.  
36
 Douglas Brinkley, “Dean Acheson and the ‘Special Relationship’: The West Point Speech 
of December 1962,” The Historical Journal  33:3, 1990, pp599-608. 
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place in European integration has never been as settled as its desire to seek 
close relations with the USA. 37  When economic interests, combined with 
geopolitical fears that Britain was being excluded from US and European 
decisions shaping Europe, drove UK to seek membership, it all came with a 
sense of reluctance that has pervaded the relationship ever since.38  
 
Despite this reluctance, for the USA Britain has been a central player in 
European integration and European geopolitics. This might not appear so 
from Britain’s European political debate, or the UK’s opt outs from the Euro, 
Schengen, and some justice and home affairs cooperation. Yet, on closer 
inspection, the UK has been a keen advocate of a range of policy areas that 
aligned with US positions. The Single Market’s free trade and liberalisation, 
EU enlargement, EU cooperation on foreign, security and defence matters are 
all in part the product of UK’s efforts.  
 
British efforts to engage the USA in European affairs have themselves been 
aimed at ensuring the USA remains committed to European security and 
affairs. It is for this reason that the UK has been labelled a ‘Janus faced’ 
European, with one face – often domestic – being a poisonous debate about 
sovereignty, foreigners and nationalism and one where a preference for 
relations with the US is shown. The other closed, private face – often seen in 
                                                 
37
 Timothy Garton Ash, ‘Is Britain European?’ International Affairs, 77: 1, 2001, pp. 1-14. 
38
 See George, S. An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1988.  
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the meeting rooms of Brussels – is a more constructive, balanced and 
engaging one.39  
 
This is not to deny that Britain’s part in European integration has not been 
difficult or caused awkward moments for US relations with both the UK and 
EU. Successive American presidents have sought close relations with their 
British counterparts, but such relationships are one of many the occupants of 
the White House have with European leaders. This has not always resulted in 
harmonious relations. US-UK and US-EU relations reached a low-point over 
differences of opinion over the 2003 US led invasion of Iraq, with Tony Blair’s 
strong support of the US effort putting him at odds with a number of other EU 
member states.40 But in a sign of the wider hold of Atlanticism in European 
politics, Britain was not alone in supporting the USA – a majority of today’s EU 
member states supported the Bush Administration. The split it brought about 
in the EU, however, strained both the USA’s and Britain’s relations with 
leading EU powers such as France and Germany that opposed the invasion.41  
 
Subsequent British governments have attempted to steer a slightly different 
from Washington, in no small part as a response to the electorate’s negative 
reaction to Blair’s closeness with the Bush Administration. In the UK this fitted 
with a hope Britain could move away from relying on the USA and EU, the 
                                                 
39
 Oliver, ‘Europe without Britain.’  
40
 BBC News, ‘Blair “isolated” over Iraq’ 16 March 2002. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1876015.stm, accessed Mar 2016.  
41
  William Wallace and Tim Oliver, ‘A bridge too far: the United Kingdom and the transatlantic 
relationship’, in David Andrews, ed., The Atlantic alliance under stress: US–European 
relations after Iraq. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
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twin pillars on which Britain has built its claim to great power status since 
1945. While the US continued to look to Britain for leadership, under Obama 
the US has also focused more intently on other relationships such as Japan 
and East Asia. These efforts, however, have not challenged the closeness of 
relations in the military fields – nuclear weapons, intelligence sharing, and 
Special Forces – where the US and UK have remained extremely close. 
British operations in Afghanistan were seen through to the end in no small 
part as a demonstration of commitment to the USA and the Atlantic alliance.42 
Instead of attempting to be some form of transatlantic bridge, an approach 
that under Tony Blair seemed to have traffic that went only one way, the US 
has found Cameron and his administrations to be more willing to be a part of 
coalitions where the US works with like-minded allies in Europe. This doesn’t 
mean relations have been easy. The war in Libya was a clear example of 
where both NATO and the EU were viewed in Washington as incapable of 
leading without US support, even if that was to remain somewhat hidden.43 
Barack Obama’s unease at the US taking the lead in another conflict soon ran 
into European divisions over the conflict, with Obama noting that David 
Cameron became ‘distracted by a range of other things.’44 The outcome of the 
conflict has deepened unease in the US at becoming involved in another war 
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in which European states depend on the US to do most of the fighting.45 The 
2013 House of Commons vote rejecting British involvement in military action 
in Syria was therefore in part seen in the USA as a rejection of continued 
cooperation (even if it was also a reflection of poor management by the 
government of its backbench MPs). 46  It created doubts in the USA and 
elsewhere about the UK’s reliability as a strategic partner. The close result in 
Scotland’s independence referendum also raised questions about the 
continued viability of the UK as a state. Severe cuts to British defence 
spending under the Cameron led governments since 2010 meant the UK 
looked like becoming one of the free riding allies that Obama – and a growing 
number of US politicians – have come to resent. Obama himself felt it 
necessary to pressure Cameron to ensure the UK met NATO’s two per cent 
defence spending commitment.47 Faced with emerging economic powers that 
have begun to draw American attention away from the UK and EU, US policy 
makers have found themselves faced with a UK that appears uncertain about 
what direction it should take in the world.48  
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2015 brought both clarity and uncertainty for US-UK relations. The new UK 
National Secuirty Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review, 
increased defence spending and a vote reversing the 2013 decision on Syria, 
signalled that the UK was not retreating into isolation.49 At the same time, its 
attempts to seek a renegotiated relationship with the EU have only brought 
uncertainty and strained relations.50 It did not pass unnoticed on either side of 
the Atlantic that the UK had neglected, and at times abused, relations with 
some of its closest EU and NATO allies. 51  British political debate has 
appeared oblivious to how the ‘British Question’ has become a problem for 
the EU and, to a lesser extent, the USA.52 This has raised questions in the 
US, Europe and amongst commentators in the UK about Britain’s reliability as 
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an international partner.53 The result is that on wider European matters the 
USA has looked more to Germany than to the UK for leadership in tackling 
European problems. 
 
Britain’s current debates about its relationship with the USA and EU project 
several possible futures. A renegotiated relationship inside the EU, as sought 
by David Cameron, could herald the beginning of a two-tier EU, with the UK 
located firmly in an outer tier where states focus on economic and some 
limited political integration. This could make the Eurozone the heart of the EU, 
making it and its institutions and member states the most influential actors in 
Europe’s politics, economics and non-traditional security matters. Or the UK 
could opt to withdraw, although not even Brexit campaigners are clear as to 
what this would entail or where it would leave the UK geopolitically in 
Europe.54 It would almost certainly leave the UK living in the shadow of the 
EU more so than for a UK in a two-tier EU.  
 
The US enters the UK’s EU debate in a narrow way. The US-UK economic 
relationship is substantial, with US foreign direct investment in the UK at $571 
billion with the UK being home to $4.97 trillion of US corporate overseas 
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assets. UK investments in the USA stood at $518.6 billion in 2013, with UK 
corporate assets totalling $2.39 trillion.55 Some Eurosceptics, and supporters 
of British withdrawal in the USA (located on the right of the Republican party) 
therefore voice support for the idea of the UK joining NAFTA or adopting 
some other form of trade deal with the USA as a substitute for relations with 
the EU.56 Some even talk of the need to engage the USA in building up the 
‘Anglosphere’, especially with Commonwealth countries such as Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand with some mention of countries such as India or 
states in Africa.57 The official US response has been largely dismissive of 
such ideas, arguing that the US is only interested in TTIP with the UK firmly 
part of that. 58  A British vote to leave the EU may shift this, with some 
Republicans already arguing a UK-US deal could be secured.59 However, as 
we discuss further below, whatever deal is secured would be framed by any 
US-EU trade deal.  
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Diplomats and officials in the USA, as in other allies of the UK, are also 
conscious of the potential damage the UK could inflict on itself through 
withdrawal from the EU. Brexit holds the potential to trigger another Scottish 
independence referendum with all the security implications this could bring 
with it, not least surrounding US-UK cooperation over Trident nuclear 
weapons60 The Northern Ireland peace process could be tested to breaking 
point should the UK-Irish common travel area have to end. The Irish Republic 
has repeatedly warned that the economic and security implications for it and 
Northern Ireland mean that unlike over the 2014 Scottish referendum it will 
make clear a position of opposing British withdrawal. 61  Like the Irish 
government, the US government will be mindful of how a decent into violence 
in the province should not be overlooked.62 In a wider sense Brexit would 
challenge US ideas of the UK as a great power. While predictions of the 
economic and political costs to Britain from leaving the EU can be overly 
pessimistic, it is clear that there would be costs.63 Being able to directly draw 
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on the economic power of the EU as a force enabler has been central to 
British ideas of being a great power. Without the UK, France would become 
the de facto permanent EU representative on the UNSC, bolstering its claim 
to retain its permanent seat. Other options, such as UK membership of 
NAFTA, lack much substance and offer the UK few strategic options to uphold 
a claim to being a major world power. Increased British military commitments 
in places such as the Gulf or East Asia are, like similar French commitments, 
overlooked.64 The UK might still be one of the leading soft powers in the 
world, but as a strategic actor it appears paralysed by its own internal 
debates, whether over Scotland, English nationalism, the place of London or 
future in the EU.65 This navel-gazing has led to Britain’s invisibility in Ukraine, 
its shunning any involvement in the fight to save the Eurozone, and a lack of 
solidarity with other European countries over the immigration crisis, each of 
which has raised concerns for US foreign policy. Whether on matters 
connected to the future of Europe or around the world, the UK risks losing its 
value to the USA as a strategic partner. 
 
US-European Relations  
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The USA and European Unity 
 
The political, economic and social integration of Europe in the second half of 
the twentieth century is perhaps the most stunning evolution of regional 
politics in modern history. This integration was made possible in no small part 
through the presence of US troops in Western Europe and the creation of 
NATO via the Washington Treaty in 1949. Even today there remains a 
sizeable US military presence in Europe, which remains a vital protection for 
European integration and cooperation.66 Pax Americana through NATO and 
the US military presence allowed European states – including Britain – to 
worry less about aggression from neighbouring countries. It also gave them 
space to develop more pacific integration initially based on economic 
cooperation, followed then by more politico-military integration first in NATO, 
and later in the European Community and then the European Union. The 
USA’s concerns about Europe mirror to some extent the UK’s own. For 
centuries the UK’s leading geopolitical concern has been the balance of 
power in Europe, with the central concern being to stop any preeminent power 
from emerging as a threat.67 
 
Despite the positive role that the US played in Europe following World War II, 
the European project has had a tense relationship with that American role in 
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Europe and the world. Atlanticism is at the core of US-European relations, but 
enthusiasm for Atlanticism varies among European states and amongst some 
of the US political elite. Political and ideological suspicions of the USA, lazy 
anti-Americanism, and events, such as the contrasting French and British 
experiences of Suez and the shocks from the NSA’s spying activities, have 
strained relations. Anti-Europeanism in US politics often revolves around lazy 
ideas of socialism and a feeling that Europeans would rather see American 
blood shed in their defence than their own. Antagonism was, however, limited 
in Europe most notably by West Germany’s dependence on the US for 
security and after the end of the Cold War by a grudging realisation – from 
both sides – that even if it could be said that Americans ‘are from Mars and 
Europeans are from Venus’, both share more with each other than they do 
with large areas of the rest of the world.68 The pro-US and pro-Atlanticist 
camp in Europe was strengthened by Britain’s membership of the European 
Economic Community in 1973. It was further intensified by new Eastern 
European member states admitted to the EU after 2004 being overwhelmingly 
pro-American in public and elite opinion and international policies.  
 
It might, therefore, appear that the USA should have little to worry about from 
Brexit, given the pro-American attitude of many newer members, the 
underlying strength of the Atlantic alliance and that Brexit might make for a 
more effective union (albeit one still unlikely to be effective at security and 
defence) by removing one of its more awkward members. However, as 
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Condoleezza Rice, former Bush Administration Secretary of State and 
National Security Advisor, told an audience at Chatham House in 2015: ‘It is a 
very different Europe if it is a continental one.’ 69  Brexit would be both 
unprecedented and a potentially transformative experience for the EU. 70 
Instead of worrying about how to stabilize the Middle East or maintain the 
status quo in Asia, the EU and UK will spend years if not decades negotiating 
a divorce. Ensuring this would be an amicable divorce would not be easy 
given the myriad of legal, political and economic problems that would arise 
and the need for agreement between the UK, 27 remaining EU member 
states and the European Parliament.71   
 
The US will be faced with an EU that will also spend time negotiating changes 
to itself brought about by the departure of one of its largest member states. 
The shift in the EU’s balance of power could go any number of ways, each 
with implications for the USA. The economically liberal and outward looking 
members would fear a shift towards more protectionist, interventionist 
policies.72 It would strengthen the already predominant position of Germany, 
although Berlin would lose a partner from whom it garners support on open 
market debates in the EU. The Union’s centre would shift eastwards adjusting 
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the EU’s strategic outlook. The UK’s new external relationship with the EU 
could change the relationship the EU has with several US allies and European 
NATO countries such as Norway, Iceland and Turkey, with possible 
consequences for Ukraine. 73  This could see a situation emerge where, if 
population projections hold, then by mid-century the EU could be surrounded 
by Europe’s three most populous states – Russia, Turkey and the UK 
(expected to overtake a Germany with a declining population).74 A multi-polar 
Europe, one divided between the US and Asian powers, could become a 
possibility.75  The UK, however, could find its position and ability to affect 
change to European geopolitics more limited. In the Balkans, for example, 
where Britain has traditionally played a leading role, Brexit would limit the 
UK’s place in efforts by the US, EU, and UN to bring a lasting settlement to 
the region.76 Efforts by the UK to shape such European politics through NATO 
would face practical limits given the EU’s broader range of capabilities – 
social, political, economic and non-traditional security – compared to NATO. 
 
The USA may find an EU without the UK could be a more effective and united 
actor both internally and externally, so long as Brexit does not begin the 
unravelling of the EU. Unravelling would happen if a British exit undermined 
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the Union’s defining idea of integration as best captured by the EU Treaty’s 
aim of ‘ever closer union’. Further integration has often been the response to 
crises in the EU.77  The Eurozone crisis and those surrounding Schengen 
have shown that the EU retains a view of integration as a solution. In 
Germany especially, a commitment to working through the EU and building up 
EU cooperation remains central. This does not mean there have not been 
significant difficulties, with Euroscepticism growing across the EU and some in 
Germany questioning whether European integration has gone too far.78 The 
EU has yet to face a crisis in which German decision makers display a 
marked reluctance to consider the EU as the way forward. In the few analyses 
and theories of European disintegration that exist, it is in Germany that the 
future of the EU will be decided. As Douglas Webber has argued, the EU has 
yet to face a ‘crisis made in Germany’.79 What that crisis might be remains 
unclear. While Germany has been keen to keep the UK in the EU it has made 
clear that this will not come at any cost, especially a cost that undermines the 
idea of European integration. 80  Brexit alone is insufficient to cause EU 
disintegration, but it is not impossible to imagine it testing Germany’s 
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commitment to the EU if it combined with other developments such as a 
deeper Eurozone crisis. As Webber himself notes, given the role US power 
has played in underpinning and guarding European integration, the collapse 
of the EU would raise questions about the contemporary nature and 
effectiveness of that power.   
 
US views of Europe in the world 
The USA has increasingly looked for a Europe that plays a significant role in 
managing international peace and security. Historically the EU has banked on 
the attractiveness of its political and economic arrangements as a tool to 
influence states on its borders to change their behaviour to gain admission to 
the Union or close economic and political relations. This appeal, however, has 
had little effect beyond Europe’s immediate neighbourhood or on states that 
have no desire or ability to gain admission. Furthermore, the EU remains 
staunchly focused on the idea of ‘civilian power’ despite the fact that the world 
continues to present significant security threats to Europe and despite some 
efforts to inject defence into EU cooperation. 81  Since the late 1990s 
international terrorism, nuclear proliferation, state-fragmentation and 
increased defence spending amongst rising powers have led to a security 
environment more challenging than at any time since the Cold War – a 
security environment that requires military assets and force projection 
capabilities that most of Europe lacks. This assumes, of course, that all 
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European states actually want to get involved in facing such threats, which is 
not necessarily the case.  
 
The preference among policy-makers in Washington – Democrats and 
Republicans alike – is still to work with Europe. As the most recent US 
Quadrennial Defense Review notes, European states are the partners of 
choice for the USA. 82  The decision in early 2016 to increase defence 
spending in Europe from $789 million to $3.4 billion represents the most 
recent demonstration of this commitment.83 However, this does not detract 
from the fact that US policy-makers have been repeatedly frustrated by 
European (including British) defence cuts. 84  The result is that despite 
increased financial commitments the idea of abandoning or severely limiting 
US commitments to NATO has become an accepted part of US debates 
about the future of transatlantic relations and US foreign policy.85  
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Nevertheless, for the time being the US would still like to see Europeans play 
a role whether this is through NATO or via an EU that plays a larger role 
globally, most importantly in North Africa and the Middle East. Events in 
Ukraine and the current humanitarian catastrophe in the Mediterranean, 
however, do not bode well for US aspirations, as Europe’s response to the 
crisis has been lacklustre at best. As Jeremy Shapiro and Anna Newby noted 
‘President Obama's ambition has been to disengage from wasteful conflicts in 
the wider Middle East and refocus American attention and efforts on the Asia-
Pacific. In American eyes, Europe's role in the new transatlantic bargain 
should be to facilitate this rebalancing by taking up the slack and by assuming 
more responsibility for stability and security in its own backyard.’ 86 
Washington wants European military forces that can supplement US forces 
globally. For example, in contributing to the maintenance of an aircraft carrier 
near the Persian Gulf at all times.  
 
This ambition though is stymied by continuing European defence cuts and a 
reluctance to engage in the maintenance of international security using 
military force.87  This is problematic for the EU, NATO and UK aspirations for 
continued close transatlantic defence links. As James Arbuthnot noted: ‘there 
is a risk that NATO will become an irritant for the Americans, rather than a 
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partner of choice.’88 Doubts already exist as to whether Europe – either in the 
form of the EU (with or without the UK) or European partners in NATO - would 
stand with the USA should it face a clash with China in Asia-Pacific.89 For EU 
states, challenges in their ‘near abroad’ are more tangible than those 
emanating from Asia, where their focus is instead on commercial 
opportunities. This contrasts with the USA’s geopolitical approach to that 
region. Part of the problem is that all sides seem unaware of the other’s 
capabilities and interests in the area, with the UK (and France’s) own military 
capabilities, albeit limited ones, in Asia-Pacific largely overlooked.  
 
For the USA the transatlantic relationship is about more than traditional 
security and military affairs. As discussed earlier, efforts to create TTIP are 
about turning the close economic relationship into a clearer geostrategic one. 
This has led to talk of TTIP as an ‘economic NATO’. Such talk should be 
approached with caution given unease in Europe at the securitisation of an 
already largely militarised transatlantic relationship and fears elsewhere of the 
EU and USA complementing NATO with an economically protectionist 
‘fortress Atlantic’.90 There also remain difficulties between the two sides over 
how to approach emerging powers, with the UK’s decision to partake in the 
Chinese led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank being seen in Washington 
D.C. as a worrying sign that even an ally such as the UK is prepared to 
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accommodate China for economic gain. That other US allies soon followed 
the UK’s lead added to US concerns that the economic attraction of emerging 
powers such as China will undermine Western unity and, in turn, liberal 
democratic ideals. These concerns have been behind US unease at 
Germany’s approach to China.  
 
Germany has developed a ‘special relationship’ with China driven largely by 
economic needs rather than geostrategic ones.91 It now faces a question of 
whether it chooses to be a liberal power, using its economic might to advance 
a liberal political agenda. Or does it pursue the path of a mercantile power, 
friendly with all and hostile to none? Given the economic relationship with 
countries such as Russia and China, a ‘neutral’ Germany and therefore a 
‘neutral’ EU that functions as an economic bloc, but not a political force 
pushing on areas such as human rights is not beyond the realm of 
imagination.92 This might be a useful arrangement for avoiding armed conflict 
in Europe, something Germany desperately wants. However, it would be a 
loss for the USA and other European countries that would like to see a more 
active EU in world affairs. Beyond Germany, China has invested elsewhere in 
Europe, especially Central and Eastern Europe. This is in no small part 
because of a need within these states to attract inward investment from 
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emerging powers, adding to questions about their alignment with the US on 
matters relating to China’s emergence as a global power.93 
 
A British exit from the EU would raise a number of issues for Washington’s 
approach to the transatlantic relationship in an emerging multipolar world. 
First, the USA and the EU, broadly writ, share a number of positions on trade 
and economic policy. A British withdrawal from the EU would not substantially 
alter the economic reality that trade and investment relations between the US 
and Europe are extremely important for both and set to remain so for some 
time. Second, the locust of Atlanticism in Europe more generally might not 
move as far into the negative category given the more pro-American 
tendencies of Central and Eastern European EU states. The main challenge 
here might be Washington’s own failure to cultivate positive relations. Some 
states, such as Poland, that historically supported the US have felt 
abandoned in the face of Russian aggression in Ukraine despite their resolute 
support of US objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan. Britain historically has been 
a leader in the pro-Atlanticist camp, but there is no reason why another large 
state such as Poland could not perform such a role, if it wanted to. Indeed, 
Britain’s disengagement from EU business and apparent drift over matters 
connected to European geopolitics has led the USA to look to other states 
such as Germany.94  
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Germany’s position as the predominant power means US-German relations 
will remain vitally important. The revelations that the US National Security 
Agency had been spying on German government and media, including 
allegations Chancellor Angela Merkel’s phone had been tapped left both the 
US and Germany in awkward positions.95 Here we should not overlook the 
role of the Franco-German relationship, which remains the union’s defining 
internal relationship. The EU could survive a British exit, but as noted above, it 
would quickly come to an end should Germany, and to a lesser extent, 
France, give up on it. Indeed, one of the biggest winners in Europe from Brexit 
would be France. A British departure would allow France to pull the Union 
more to the economic left, whilst allowing it to become the key US military ally 
in the EU. Since the drastic cuts to the British defence budget the US has 
increasingly looked to France for military leadership in Europe. Despite 
historical Franco-American disagreements, France re-joined NATO’s 
integrated military command structure, increasingly pursuing a more outward 
looking economic agenda than it is often given credit for. Thus it remains a 
core member of the Western alliance.96  
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The French deployment to Mali bolstered American appreciation for French 
capabilities; Mali is one of the few western interventions that seems to be a 
success. Washington was impressed with the speedy deployment of 4,000 
French combat troops to the region and it reassured the Americans that Paris 
could be counted on to manage security issues in northwest Africa. France’s 
activity against ISIS over the last year further increased Paris’ prestige in 
Washington. France deployed the aircraft carrier Charles DeGaulle to the Gulf 
to participate under US command – a first for the French Navy – in bombing 
strikes against ISIS. As Defense News stated US FA-18s landed on the 
DeGaulle and French Rafale fighters landed on US carriers.97  Although US 
forces remain more closely integrated, especially on intelligence issues, with 
Britain rather than France, there is room for this to change with Brexit.98 A 
British exit would lead to enhanced efforts on the part of the USA to build 
relations with Germany and France, in particular focusing on the economic 
leadership role of Germany and the military leadership role of France in the 
EU.   
 
There is no reason to expect that an EU without Britain would be interested in 
launching a serious challenge to US military or political hegemony to balance 
US power like De Gaulle once envisioned. It is far easier to free-ride on the 
US security guarantee than to ramp up defence spending and there is no 
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reason to balance what, in Europe at least, is a ‘benign hegemon.’ The main 
concern for the USA is the ability of European states to contribute to 
international peace and security and the possibility that an unwillingness to do 
so drives the USA further towards a position of giving up on the Europeans in 
the hope this might provoke them into acting on their own. Britain historically 
has advocated for a more interventionist Europe, but this support has fallen 
off, most notably in the 2013 refusal of the British Parliament to support a 
hawkish line against Syrian Bashar Al-Assad after he used chemical weapons 
on his own people. Given that NATO remains the premier military organ in 
Europe, it seems unlikely that Brexit will have much effect on Washington’s 
current ability (as distinct from willingness) to influence European military 
matters, since any substantive European defence decisions are made via 
NATO in conversation with Washington and Ottawa, rather than via the EU. 
The EU is becoming ever so slowly more cogent on foreign policy, but 
defence remains an issue primarily for NATO. 
 
Conclusion 
The USA’s relationship with the UK and the rest of Europe remains one 
defined by shared ideas, deeply entwined economic and security interests, 
institutional arrangements, common international problems and individual 
leaders and elites who remain Atlanticist in outlook. In the uncertain world that 
it faces, the US government would prefer the states of the North Atlantic to 
continue to work closely together on issues of international peace and 
security. Brexit would complicate these relations, but not undermine them 
unless it aligned with other crises and changes to both the EU and USA that 
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have the potential to drive them apart. It is the UK that has the most to lose 
from a Brexit, becoming a country whose unity could be thrown into question 
and who would have to work harder to affect changes in the wider 
transatlantic relationship. In such a situation the USA could find its closest ally 
becomes an awkward inbetweener, beholden largely to how the larger US-EU 
relationship moves forward. 
 
Nevertheless, there is no escaping the fact that the role of Britain in the EU is 
important to the US, to US-EU cooperation and the wider transatlantic 
relationship. Despite this, British political debate rarely considers the 
implications that the referendum result could have on wider European and 
transatlantic security, economic and political arrangements. While we envision 
relations remaining cordial, albeit with the UK as an awkward inbetweener, we 
set out below three possible scenarios for the USA – the good, the bad and 
the ugly – that could occur depending on how the referendum mixes with 
other pressures.  
 
The good: the best scenario for the USA and stable transatlantic relations is 
one where the British people vote to remain within the EU, with the UK-EU 
renegotiation and referendum followed by a sustained effort by the UK 
government to rebuild relations with an EU for whom the ‘British question’ has 
been an unwanted distraction from other matters. Should a new EU Treaty 
emerge the UK would be in a stronger position to push for changes that 
strengthen the Union while ensuring the UK remains an active member inside 
it rather than pushing for changes from the outside. For the USA this option 
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ensures the EU’s foremost Atlanticist power remains a part of Europe’s 
predominant organisation for economics, politics and non-military security. 
This could also help ensure the EU focuses not only on domestic European 
matters but also on issues outside the EU, especially in its near-abroad. A UK 
engaging with its European partners would help show that isolationism and 
populism has its limits.  
 
The bad: UK-EU relations muddle through, with a referendum result to stay in 
or leave not leading to any clear settled relationship. Animosity remains on 
both sides, particularly between UK and EU leaders who feel aggrieved at the 
renegotiation and referendum result. Neither side is willing to do more than 
make the minimal commitment to make a relationship work. For the USA, 
Britain’s place in transatlantic relations would remain important, but it would 
play the part of an awkward inbetweener, beholden largely to how the larger 
US-EU relationship moves forward. Any effort by the UK to play the part of a 
transatlantic arbitrator would find some footing in the context of NATO and 
traditional military matters, although even here the USA will be aware that the 
future of NATO and EU enlargement and EU foreign policy rests more in 
Germany. Britain’s attempts at leadership may be welcomed by some 
Republicans, but would be extremely difficult – and likely fiercely resisted by 
the EU and its member states – in areas such as economics and wider 
political relations where Washington will be conscious of the need to pay 
attention to the wider EU and, again, in particular Germany. The USA would 
have to work around Britain in its wider relations with the EU. Both the UK and 
EU would remain difficult partners for the USA in dealings with Asia.  
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The ugly: A British exit leads to a severe deterioration in UK-EU relations. A 
UK that is denied some privileged external relationship with the EU could be 
tempted to act as a spoiler in any efforts at NATO-EU cooperation, particularly 
if the rest of the EU tried to develop in a more united way. This is not 
unprecedented as is evident in NATO-EU relations regarding Turkey, Greece 
and Cyprus for example, a long-running headache for US approaches to 
South-Eastern Europe. A particularly ugly scenario would see Brexit unleash 
centrifugal forces that begin the unravelling of the EU. Here the place of 
Germany would be key, with Brexit triggering some form of German crisis in 
confidence in the EU. More likely Brexit would lead to the UK’s fragmentation, 
with Scotland leaving the UK to re-join the EU, violence erupting in Northern 
Ireland, while the businesses and inhabitants of the international and 
European metropolis of London are left feeling resentful towards the rest of 
the UK. The USA would be faced with the fallout from the fragmentation of 
one of its closest allies.   
 
Should a Brexit lead to EU disintegration then weaknesses and divisions in 
Europe would likely invite Russian meddling in Central Europe and the idea 
that the Kremlin might put pressure on some former Soviet territories such as 
the Baltic republics is not beyond the realm of imagination. In this case, 
Washington would have serious questions to answer about how to respond to 
such a crisis. Given the preoccupation in Washington with the Asia-Pacific 
region, coupled with extreme frustration about the ability of Europeans to 
manage European problems, the US might decide to allow for a new status 
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quo in Europe, preferring to divert its energies to Asia rather than a declining 
Europe that is seemingly unable to function as a cogent actor in international 
relations. Washington will also be extremely alert to the potential for Brexit to 
make the EU less accommodating to US and Atlantic priorities – if the EU 
does not collapse of course. US policy makers would be conscious of what 
such developments would say about US power and the potential effect it 
could have on isolationist feelings in their domestic politics. Other world 
powers may interpret further tensions within NATO and a fragmenting or 
weakened EU as a sign of the deterioration of two of the major institutions the 
USA has committed itself to the creation and development of since World War 
II. 
 
There is, in short, no good outcome for the USA resulting from a British 
decision to leave the EU. Some British Eurosceptics might dream of Britain 
becoming a North Atlantic Singapore or a ‘Switzerland with nukes’, neglecting 
the fact that Singapore and Switzerland play minor roles in regional politics 
and are ultimately subject to regional politics rather than shapers of it. British 
debate about the EU has too often ignored the benefits of EU membership the 
complexities of withdrawal, and with some debate pointing to a yearning for 
some sort of imperial past that is long over. The crisis of British membership 
in the EU is in part a result of a changing EU, but is also one that British 
politicians have exaggerated over the past several decades. This is not to say 
that there are not serious issues with the governance and direction of the EU. 
These, however, are problems in which the US has a clear interest in seeing 
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solved, from which the UK cannot escape, and which a Brexit has the 
potential to make worse rather than help solve. 
